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COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA
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Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * *
Plaintiff and Appellant, Rio Algom Corporation, ("Rio"),
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby submits its brief in support of its
petition for a rehearing in this action.

Rio asserts that this

Court should grant it a rehearing with respect to the Court's
decision in this matter for the following reasons:

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING THAT RIO
IS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDS RESULTING
FROM THE AUDREYS' PERMANENT NON-EXERCISE OF
THE OPTION TO RECEIVE ROYALTIES BASED UPON
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF CRUDE ORE.
Rio does not seriously quarrel with the basic logical reasoning of the court's decision in this matter.

The Court has care-
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grounds that, although not beyond argument, are certainly within
reasonable parameters.

Rio seriously urges, however, that by the

simple accumlation of a series of proper syllogisms, as was the
Court's opinion, an end result has been reached which is neither
just nor equitable.

What has happened, as Rio views it, is that

the arguably correct application of a string of legal syllogisms
has produced a result which is less than the sum of its parts,
which is unjust, and which, viewed from a different perspective,
should be overturned.
Rio frankly recognizes that in its quest before this Court it
has had to strain and analogize to find applicable law.

Rio fur-

ther concedes that there is contract language which, viewed from
a certain perspective, could be considered to be determinative of
the issues.

Rio respectfully suggests, however, that the Court's

perspective in this matter has been myopic and that, viewed from a
different vantage point, the result is inequitable and unfair.
Rio is not critical of the Court for this result because the Court
has been led into this failure of perception by the defendants'
frequent reference to what they have done as merely being a "settlement"

a characterization which, for all who are involved in

litigation, quickly vibrates the heart's tuning fork.
is good.

Settlement ends disputes.

aged and condoned wherever possible.

Settlement

Settlement should be encourThe defendants have called

their arrangement a settlement so frequently that it has evoked
the Lewis Carroll response -- "What I tell you three times is
true."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In an effort to give this Court a different perspective on
the issues before it, and to request one more quick look at what
should be perceived as a clear deprivation of Rio's rights, let
Rio pose a totally apt hypothetical, and simply ask the Court to
consider and compare it with the result in the instant case.
Assume that A and B jointly own property, A having a 75% and
B a 25% undivided interest.

They decide to lease the property to

C for a one year term with an option to renew at the end of the
term.

Because of a conflict of interest, or any other reason, B

gives A the complete, sole, unilateral power to set the amount of
the rental

c is required to pay for both the initial term and, if

C exercises, under the option.

A sets the rental at $1,000 per

month for the initial term of the lease.

A and B split the rent-

als, A receiving $750 per month and B $250 per month in direct
proportion to the interest in the property each holds.
At the end of the initial term it becomes clear to A that C
can be required to pay, under the terms of the option to renew, a
rental of $2,000 per month.

C, however, being fully aware of the

sole power granted A by B to set the amount of rent required of C,
goes to A and offers to pay A $250 per month under an open, separate arrangement, if A will agree to leave C's rent requirement at
$1,000 per month when C exercises his option.

A, in exercise of

his power, agrees.
Under this arrangement c pays to A and B jointly $1,000, and
pays to A alone an additional $250.

A now receives from C $1,000
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and B gets only $250.

This is a result that no court would coun-

tenance, or fail to give B redress for, if B complained.

Yet this

result is precisely what the Court is approving by its decision in
1
this matter. A, i.e. the Audreys, is receiving increased rent or
royalties from its lessee, B, i.e. the Jimcos, while B, a coowner, i.e. Rio, is not sharing in that increase.

In order to

justly resolve the issues the Court must require the Audreys to
share their increased royalties with Rio.
In its decision the Court approved the Audreys' permanent
revocation of the right of Rio and the Audreys to receive royalties based upon the fair market value of crude ore.

However, in

approving the Audreys' right to permanently revoke this election,
the Court overlooked the requirement that the proceeds arising out
of any election belong to both Rio and the Audreys, because of
Rio's status as a co-owner of the subject properties and because
of the terms of the Amended Audrey Lease.

Consequently, all pro-

ceeds resulting from the exercise or non-exercise of the election
rightfully belong to both Rio and the Audreys, and the consideration received by the Audreys from the Jimcos for the Audrey's
permanent non-exercise of the option belong to both Rio and the
Audreys.

1 The term "Audreys" as used in this Brief is as defined in
Footnote 3 of the Court's September 19, 1980 decision in this
matter. The term "Jimcos" as used in this Brief is as defined in
Footnote 2 of that decision.
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The Court's failure to require the Audreys to share the proceeds of their permanent non-exercise of the fair market value
option with Rio produces an unjust result because the effect is to
diminish Rio's royalty interests as a l/4th interest co-owner and
co-lessor.

In the event royalties based upon the irrevocably

waived formula would exceed royalties based upon the formula in
effect under the settlement agreement, both the Audreys and Rio
receive less.

The Audreys, however, will be compensated for the

smaller payment by virtue of the Jimcos' agreement to pay the
Audreys an additional 2.5% of the yellowcake sales price due the
Jimcos.

The Audreys will thus receive as their share of the total

royalties an amount equivalent to 5.5% of the total sales price of
yellowcake.

On the other hand, Rio receives nothing to compensate

it for the loss of its right to share in royalties that would be
received under the fair market value option.

Such a scheme is

patently unfair to Rio.
The Court's opinion indicates that the terms of the Amended
Audrey Lease contemplate that Rio may receive a smaller royalty
payment under an election by the Audreys.

That lease, however,

does not contemplate or suggest that Rio would receive a royalty
payment smaller in proportion to the required one-fourth/threefourths ratio.

Although the Court's opinion states that the

Audreys and Rio share proportionately in the royalty payments made
pursuant to the Audrey lease, this statement fails to address the
realities of the situation.

Instead of a one-fourth/three-fourths
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ratio, the Audreys will receive three-fourths of the amount computed from the lov'er-yielding formula plus a further share of
royalties to be paid by the Jimcos.

Rio, on the other hand, does

not receive one-fourth of the amount received by the Audreys.
Rather, it receives one-fourth of the smaller sum computed from
the lower-yielding formula, without a proportionate share of the
additional payment received from the Jimcos.

The parties to the

Amended Audrey Lease never intended, or agreed, that Rio would
receive less than one-fourth of the amount paid to the co-owners
of the Audrey claims.
Under the Amended Audrey Lease all royalties and proceeds
flowing from the property rightfully belong to all the owners of
the property, including Rio.

(Record 80-83.)

These include all

royalties based upon either a yellowcake proceeds calculation or a
crude ore fair market value calculation.

(Record 80-83.)

In the

settlement agreement the Audreys permanently revoked the right of
Rio and the Audreys to receive royalties based upon the fair
market value calculation, in exchange for an additional 2.5%
royalty assigned by the Jimcos.

This permanent non-exercise of

the fair market value option became effective on January l, 1979
and remains in effect permanently thereafter.

Thus, the addi-

tional monies received by the Audreys from the Jimcos, after
January 1, 1979, is consideration for the non-exercise of the fair
market value option and the proceeds of that non-exercise are, by
the terms of the settlement (and the Court's opinion), a royalty
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related to production from the property which rightfully belong to
Rio and the Audreys, even though Rio is not entitled to participate in the option decision.
Although there does not appear to be any case law totally on
point with the instant case, there is a relevant line of oil, gas
and mineral cases dealing with very similar fact situations.
Those cases deal primarily with the question of what obligation,
if any, is owed by the holder of the executive right to lease to
the owners of non-executive royalty or mineral interests.
The owners of non-executive interests have no participation
powers.

They have no right to enter upon the premises for devel-

opment purposes and no right to execute leases to others.

As a

consequence, they are almost wholly dependent upon the selfinterest of the mineral owner and upon certain principles of
equity and fair play to require the executive mineral owner to
mine the resources and protect their interest.

Martz and Hames,

Implied Rights of the Royalty Owners, 30 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1957).

Although the self-interest of the holder of the executive
right frequently coincides with that of the non-executive, there
may be instances when the self-interest of the executive will
d1verge from that of the non-executive.

When those interests are

divergent, courts have not left the royalty owner completely at
the mercy of the holder of the executive-leasing privilege.
Indeed, the great weight of authority holds that an implied duty
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governs the exercise of the executive right.

c. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law

§

2 H. Williams &

339.2, at 201 (1977), (hereinafter

"Williams & Meyers"), and cases cited therein.

The duty, which

arises through the relation created by a reservation or granting
of the exclusive right to lease, is to protect the

non-participa~

interests that are dependent to a great extent on the executive.
Id.; Blass and Richey, An Analysis of the Rights and Duties of
the Holder of the Executive Right, 41 Miss. L. J. 189, 224-225

(1970).

Stated conversely, the executive operates under a duty tc

not exercise the executive right for the purpose of benefiting
himself at the expense, in a preferential way, of the non-executiw
Williams & Meyers,

§

339.3 at 210.

In the present case, Rio's position is similar to that of a
non-participatory royalty owner.

Because of a conflict of inter-

est, Rio has granted the Audreys the exclusive right to elect
which royalty formula will be utilized in a given year.

Thus,

like the non-participatory royalty owner, Rio has no input in an
elective decision affecting the royalty payment.

Normally, it

would be reasonable for Rio to place its trust in the self-interes;
of the Audreys since the parties stand together as co-lessors and
would appear to have the same common interest --to choose that
formula which would maximize the co-lessors' royalty payments.
In this case, however, the Audreys have used the advantage
conferred on them by Rio to deprive Rio of its rightful share of
proceeds arising out of the properties subject to the Amended
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Audrey Lease. 2

Th e Au d reys h ave c1rcumvented
.
the provisions of

the Amended Audrey lease by entering into an arrangement with the
Jimcos which benefits the Audreys to the exclusion of Rio.
Although the courts in the non-executive royalty owner cases
have found an implied duty of equitable treatment and fair play on
the part of the executive in his dealings with the non-participating
or non-executive owner, there is not complete agreement on the
nature of the duty owed.

The standard of conduct governing the

exercise of the executive right ranges from a fiduciary duty to a
standard of ordinary care and good faith.
§

Williams & Meyers,

339.2 at p. 208; Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Tex. L.

Rev. 569 (1948).

Irrespective of the proper standard, any of the

overwhelming majority of the cases finding that a duty is owed
would find a breach of the duty when the executive -- in this
case, the Audrey defendants -- uses the special position he has
for his own special advantage to the exclusion of the interests of

2 As argued above, Rio will receive one-fourth of.a loweryieldlng formula instead of one-fourth of the h1gher-y1eld1ng
formula. The Audreys, on the other hand, will receive threefourths of the lower-yielding formula, but in additi~n, they will
receive additional sums from the Jimcos from wh1ch R10 w1ll not
be given its proportionate share. Further, it should be noted
that although the Court has characterized this as an agreement by
which the Jimcos paid 2.5% of the yellowcake pr1ce to the Audreys,
it is clear that any monies paid to the Audreys has to come out of
the monies designated for the Jimcos because the co-owners of the
Audrey claims have priority with respect to the royalt1es to be
paid.
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the non-executive, in this case, Rio.

Williams & Meyers, § 339.3

at 210; 41 Miss. L. J. at 227.
consequently, as has been demonstrated above, even though the
Audreys may have the absolute right to forego exercise of the fair
market value option, regardless of Rio's interest, they may not
exercise or not exercise that option without sharing in the proceeds resulting from that decision with Rio.

This is precisely

what the approval by this Court of the settlement agreement between
the Audreys and the Jimcos effects.

This approval, foreclosing

Rio's full participat1on in the proceeds of the non-exercise of
the fair market value option from 1979 forward, constitutes a
denial, and a derogation, of Rio's property and contract rights.
This is clear error and the Court should rehear this matter and
reverse itself with respect to this oversight.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THIS
LAWSUIT HAS BEEN SETTLED.
The Court's opinion in this action, at page 11, concludes
that the agreement at issue in this appeal settles "lengthy and
costly litigation over the disposition of royalty payments."
fact, lengthy and costly litigation still remains.

In

Yet to be

resolved is the disposition, as between the Jimcos and Rio, of
royalty payments which have accrued to both parties for the years
1976 through 1978.

The court still must determine what the "fair

market value of crude ore'' at the mine portal is and allocate to
Rio one-fourth of 8% of that determined value.

Additionally, all
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the allegations of the Jimcos' counterclaims remain for resolution.
The "settlement stipulation" approved by the Court in its opinion
leaves in place, for costly and time consuming litigation, these
issues.

Consequently, one of the major reasons for the judicial

policy of encouraging settlement, i.e. conservation of judicial
resources, does not apply to the rationale set out in the Court's
opinion used in reaching the result obtained.

Judicial resources

will not be conserved as a lengthy, time consuming and expensive
court proceeding remains.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in Rio's Petition for Rehearing and
1n this Brief, the Court should grant Rio's Petition for Rehearing
and reverse its opinion filed in this matter on September 19,
1980.

Further, the Court is requested to authorize oral argument

with respect to the Petition for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted this

.J.j~day

of October, 1980.
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